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THE POLITICIZATION OF LEGAL 
EXPERTISE IN THE TTIP NEGOTIATION 
FERNANDA G. NICOLA∗ 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In pursuing a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with 
the European Union (EU) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Obama 
Administration aims to create economic growth while strengthening the 
Western bloc to contain the rising Chinese power and the regulatory challenges 
posed by the expansion of the Chinese markets.1 In entering into such a 
bilateral, rather than multilateral, negotiating framework, the U.S. and EU 
administrations are choosing an alternative route to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) for international cooperation. Beyond the geopolitical 
implications of TTIP, the battle turf for its negotiation is embedded in a 
complex regulatory web of private and public governance mechanisms in which 
administrative legal experts and their ideological orientation play a large, and 
often unspoken, role. This article examines legal tools and ideological choices 
that administrative law experts have put forward to respond to the demands of 
civil society and politicians regarding the need for greater transparency and 
participation in trade negotiation. Although trade negotiations happen in 
secret, negotiators on both sides of the Atlantic have strategically used notions 
of transparency and participation in administrative law to advance their 
respective bargaining power and to gain more legitimacy toward the general 
public. 
One of the central goals of TTIP revolves primarily around deepening 
international regulatory cooperation (IRC); namely, eliminating inefficient and 
unnecessary incompatibilities created by differing administrative structures that 
burden industries and trade across the Atlantic. This notion was already present 
in President Obama’s Executive Order (EO) 13,609 issued in 2012, which aimed 
to promote IRC as a way to ensure that divergent regulatory approaches 
adopted between U.S. agencies and their foreign counterparts do not impair the 
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ability of companies to export and compete on a global level.2 In trying to 
reconcile the need for regulatory efficiency with safety, health, labor, and 
environmental standards, the EO portrayed IRC as a mechanism aimed at 
identifying protective approaches to “reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary 
differences in regulatory requirements.”3 
Led by the European Commission and its trade negotiators, the EU has 
been willing to partner with the United States on equal footing, rather than 
simply entering into a free-trade agreement, in order to identify commonalities 
on horizontal regulatory issues.4 Partnering as equals in a regulatory dialogue, 
however, has created not only numerous tensions between the two 
administrations but also several roadblocks in the TTIP negotiations.5 The 
Commission faces political and technical pressures from the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) that has put forward the advantages of its 
regulatory system as more efficient and transparent with streamlined cost-
benefit procedures.6 On the other hand, the Commission prides itself on its 
methodological pluralism in carrying out impact assessments and its proactive 
and more democratic attempt to involve large groups of civil society 
representatives in regulatory processes.7 
While trade negotiators have been busy reconciling these regulatory 
differences, TTIP has sparked promises and criticisms from businesses, workers, 
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), as well as from believers of 
multilateralism in international trade circles, because of the impact of TTIP on 
third countries left out of the negotiation.8 Some have applauded, and others 
 
 2.  Exec. Order No. 13,609, 3 C.F.R. 26413 (2012).   
 3.  Id.; see also Paul R. Verkuil & Reeve T. Bull, The Administrative Conference’s Role in 
Supporting Regulatory Cooperation, Administrative Conference of the United States (Dec. 2, 2014).  
 4.  See TTIP Round 9 – final day press conference - Comments by EU Chief Negotiator Ignacio 
Garcia Bercero, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/april/tradoc_153394.pdf. 
 5. In this respect, ensuring joint transatlantic leadership in the development of global norms 
and standards goes hand in hand with building progressively a more integrated transatlantic 
marketplace. Critically these rules and institutions would not be credible if we fail to deliver 
the concrete and measurable reduction in costs for business through mutual recognition or by 
other means to avoid the unnecessary duplication of regulatory costs. 
 Karel de Gucht, EU Trade Commissioner, Remarks on TTIP Ahead of the Second Round of 
Negotiations, DELEGATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION TO THE U.S., http://www.euintheus.org/press-
media/eu-trade-commissioner-karel-de-gucht-on-ttip-ahead-of-the-second-round-of-negotiations/ (last 
visited Dec. 31, 2014).  
 6.  When we talk about regulation and standards, we are talking about how to bridge the 
divergences between two well-regulated markets, not about launching a broad deregulatory 
agenda. We are focused on reducing unnecessary costs that damage our collective 
competitiveness in an increasingly competitive global economy, perhaps resulting in what my 
former colleague, Cass Sunstein, has called “simpler” regulation. 
Michael Froman, U.S. Trade Representative, Remarks on the United States, the European Union, and 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Sept. 30, 2013), 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/speeches/transcripts/2013/september/froman-us-eu-ttip.   
 7.  See Anne Meuwese, Constitutional Aspects of Regulatory Coherence in TTIP: An EU 
Perspective, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015, at 160.   
 8.  Michelle Egan, Is TTIP Really That Different? The TTIP: The Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States, in THE TTIP 19, 25 (Joaquin 
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criticized, the high economic and employment benefits calculated by experts on 
both sides to justify the optimistic opening of the negotiation.9 While trade 
liberalization politics are increasingly challenged by politicians in Congress with 
the approval of Trade Promotion Authority and in the European Parliament, 
the procedures and ideological choices in IRC are portrayed as a technical 
realm in which lawyers attempt to extrapolate best practices or pragmatically 
reconcile conflicting procedures. 
The understanding that TTIP will likely revolve around IRC worries 
politicians and civil society alike because of the constraint that this could create 
for domestic regulation and a resulting lack of transparency and participation in 
the negotiation.10 In response to democratic-deficit and transparency concerns, 
trade negotiators are using the technical language of regulatory cooperation 
rather than convergence to show how their respective administrative law 
regimes best reflect the values enshrined in Western liberal democracies, such 
as transparency, openness, and participation in decisionmaking. In this process, 
lawyers are tasked to reconcile administrative law divergences by addressing 
“best” models or “experimentalist” approaches to overcome the regulatory 
roadblocks in TTIP. 
Part I offers a historical roadmap to understand the initial steps in 
transatlantic trade and regulatory approximation between the United States 
and the European Economic Community. With the establishment of a 
transatlantic dialogue in the 1970s, the European Commission secured a first-
mover advantage vis-à-vis the U.S. administration through its ability to regulate 
a complex multilevel governance regime and the principle of mutual 
recognition. Rather than an impediment to transatlantic trade, the European 
regulatory model put forward by the Commission was perceived as an asset to 
the regulation of complex sectors.  Later, with the limited success of mutual 
recognition agreements (MRAs) and the launch of the High Level Regulatory 
Cooperation Forum (HLRCF) under the Bush Administration, this new phase 
of coordination under the leadership of the HLRCF marked the increasing 
participation of administrative agencies under the lead of the White House. At 
this point, the U.S. administration was able to secure a first-mover advantage in 
transatlantic regulatory cooperation. The shifts in bargaining power between 
the EU and U.S. administrations was based on contingent and often external 
situations rather than the result of “best” or more “efficient” internal regulatory 
practices in their respective administrative processes.11 
 
Roy & Roberto Dominguez eds., 2014).  
 9.  See WERNER RAZA, JAN GRUMILLER, LANCE TAYLOR, BERNHARD TRÖSTER & RUDI VON 
ARNIM, ASSESS TTIP: ASSESSING THE CLAIMED BENEFITS OF THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND 
INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP (TTIP) FINAL REPORT 5–8 (2014).  
 10.  Kal Raustiala, Domestic Institutions and International Regulatory Cooperation: Comparative 
Responses to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 49 WORLD POL. 482, 488 (1997). 
 11. See generally Abraham Newman & Elliot Posner, Putting the EU in Its Place: Policy Strategies 
and the Global Regulatory Context, 22 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 1316 (2015) (addressing the embeddedness 
of the Global Regulatory context). 
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Part II analyzes the regulatory tools and ideological conflicts that trade 
negotiators need to reconcile to achieve regulatory cooperation in TTIP. The 
USTR and the Commission have promoted different regulatory tools for IRC 
(negative versus positive lists, soft versus hard law), as well as different value-
based approaches to regulatory practice (democratic participation versus 
efficiency). Throughout the TTIP negotiation, lawyers have worked closely with 
trade negotiators to reconcile divergences in horizontal regulatory practices. 
Part III shows how the work of scholars has attempted to reconcile IRC 
under the label of global administrative law (GAL). In light of the critiques to 
GAL, more recently, scholars have replaced universal approaches with more 
contingent and pragmatic approaches to what they call global experimentalist 
governance (GXG). Rather than favoring legal convergence in GAL or legal 
experimentalism in GXG—on the conflicts arising in IRC, this article suggests a 
different path.  By focusing on each conflict arising in horizontal regulatory 
issues these should be understood by scholars as the result of an ideological 
trade-off between lawyers and a bargaining tool for negotiators.12 
Part IV shows how the general principles of transparency, openness, and 
participation in administrative law have become a bargaining chip for TTIP 
negotiators regardless of the principles’ distributive consequences. This part 
compares EU and U.S. regulatory approaches through a “hermeneutic of 
suspicion.”13 Rather than a neutral approach geared toward “better” or 
“experimentalist” forms of governance, it foregrounds the political choices of 
the negotiators and the distributive consequence of the regulatory practices 
promoted on different private and public entities ranging from individuals to 
civil society. 
II 
THE HISTORY OF TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION 
A. From Multilateralism to Bilateralism 
Since the 1930s, trade agreements have been designed to eliminate border 
measures, lower tariffs, and address “indirect protectionism” as goals carried 
out by GATT article III—the quintessential national treatment rule which 
eliminates discrimination against foreign products.14 In the 1970s, governments 
were committed to going beyond protectionist regulations and addressing the 
so-called “increasingly regulatory divergence” and unnecessary barriers to 
 
 12.  See Giulio Napolitano, Conflicts and Strategies in Administrative Law, 12 INT’L J. CONST. L. 35 
(2014).  
 13.  See BRIAN LEITNER, The Hermeneutics of Suspicions: Recovering Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, 
in THE FUTURE OF PHILOSOPHY 74–104 (2004). 
 14.  SIMON LESTER, THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE REGIME IN GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 4 (2011); Simon Lester and Inu Barbee, The Challenge of Cooperation: Regulatory 
Trade Barriers  in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 16 J. INT’L ECON. L. 847, 859 
(2013).  
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trade.15 The role of international trade agreements was expanded to set, at the 
global level, the standards adopted by domestic regulators. Through IRC trade, 
negotiators could directly address the relationship between domestic 
regulations and international trade. 
In the 1980s, conflicting logics of trade liberalization and social market 
regimes led to an expansion of IRC with a focus on domestic regulation’s 
impediment to international trade.16  The scope of trade and investment 
agreements grew beyond border measures such as tariff and quota controls. The 
main barriers remaining to international trade were alternately referred to as 
nontariff barriers, “behind the border” barriers, or simply as domestic 
regulation which has become the center of attention in international trade 
negotiations.17 In transatlantic trade relations, multinational businesses were 
worried about duplicative compliance costs, whereas the United States alleged 
that the changing European single market would offer a competitive advantage 
to EU firms at the expense of their competitors.18 
As a response, the European Community (EC) and the U.S. administration 
set up institutionalized dialogues on different governance levels to prevent 
unilateral implementation of domestic regulation that could hamper 
transatlantic trade.19 The 1990 Transatlantic Declaration “committed both sides 
to address[ing] and solv[ing] problems of common interest, including regulatory 
barriers, resulting in annual reports in which each side set forth its trade 
grievances against the other.”20 This Declaration called for mutual information-
sharing and cooperation on important political and economic matters. This 
collaboration was to be achieved through biannual consultations between U.S. 
and EU officials, briefings by the EU Presidency to the U.S. representatives at 
the ministerial level, and cooperation between legislators.21 When the EC began 
its internal market program in the early 1990s, the United States was concerned 
that progress toward EC-wide standards would create a “Fortress Europe” that 
 
 15.  Alberto Alemanno, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the Parliamentary 
Dimension of Regulatory Cooperation 5 (2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/ 
join/2014/433847/EXPO-AFET_ET(2014)433847_EN.pdf.   
 16.  George A. Bermann et al., Introduction, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: 
LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 1, 14 (George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen & 
Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2000). 
 17.  Suzanne Berger, Introduction, in NATIONAL DIVERSITY AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 1, 16 
(Suzanne Berger & Ronald Dore eds., 1996). 
 18.  Gregory Shaffer, Managing U.S.–EU Trade Relations Through Mutual Recognition and Safe 
Harbor Agreements: ‘New’ and ‘Global’ Approaches to Transatlantic Economic Governance?, 9 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 37 (2002). 
 19.  OLIVER ZIEGLER, EU REGULATORY DECISION MAKING AND THE ROLE OF THE UNITED 
STATES: TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION AS A GATEWAY FOR U. S. ECONOMIC 
INTERESTS? 68 (2012). 
 20.  DAVID VOGEL, BARRIERS OR BENEFITS?  REGULATION IN TRANSATLANTIC TRADE 9 
(1997). 
 21.  DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION, THE TRANSATLANTIC 
TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP AND THE PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION OF REGULATORY 
COOPERATION 25 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2423562. 
NICOLA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/8/2016  2:40 PM 
180 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 78:175 
American businesses would not be able to penetrate.22 
The U.S. administration urged the Commission to permit American-based 
firms to participate in setting standards and certifying compliance with them.23 
Transatlantic regulatory cooperation began in May 1992 when the Commission 
agreed to establish procedures for the participation of U.S. firms in the 
European standard-settings bodies as well as to negotiate MRAs for product 
safety and quality.24 The Commission released a report in 1992 following the 
Transatlantic Declaration, urging an “in-depth bilateral dialogue” to reduce 
trade barriers.25 On both sides, the administrations undertook dialogues, 
uncovering differences in substantive policy, regulatory style, and procedural 
obstacles.26 
In the aftermath of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, the newly created EU 
established the Unit for Regulatory Relations with the United States within the 
Director-General for External Relations, which, in turn, established the EU–
U.S. Inter-Service Group, consisting of representatives from most Directorates-
General of the Commission, which was responsible for coordinating, 
overseeing, and promoting regulatory cooperation with the United States.27 
In November 1995, the Seville Conference, under the auspices of the 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD) established a Transatlantic Advisory 
Committee on Standards, Certification, and Regulatory Policy to work jointly 
toward a new regulatory model based on the optimistic principle “approved 
once, and accepted everywhere.”28 The TABD was a business-led government–
business forum initiated by the U.S. Department of Commerce and aided by the 
Commission.29 The TABD’s goal was not only to lower trade and investment 
barriers across the Atlantic but also to achieve a “barrier-free transatlantic 
market.”30 In December 1995, the Clinton Administration established the New 
Transatlantic Agenda, aimed to prioritize economic ties and transform the 
transatlantic relationship from one of consultation to one of joint action.31 
 
 22.  Id. at 8.  
 23.  See MICHELLE EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET: STANDARDS, REGULATION 
AND GOVERNANCE (2001). 
 24.  Vogel, supra note 20, at 9 (quoting  George Bermann, Regulatory Cooperation between the 
European Commission and U.S. Administrative Agencies, 9 ADMINISTRATIVE L. J. 972 (1996)).  
 25.  Bermann, supra note 24, at 957–58.  
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Id.  
 29.  Vann H. Wilber & Paul T. Eichbrecht, Transatlantic Trade, the Automotive Sector: The Role of 
Regulation in a Global Industry, Where We Have Been and Where We Have to Go, How Far Can EU–
US Cooperation Go Toward Achieving Regulatory Harmonization?, in SYSTEMIC IMPLICATIONS OF 
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY COOPERATION AND COMPETITION 165, 176 (Simon J. Evenett & 
Robert M. Stern eds., 2011).   
 30.  EU–USA Regulatory Cooperation, EUROPEAN COMM’N,, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/cooperating-governments/usa/regulatory-
cooperation (last visited Dec. 31, 2014).  
 31.  Alberto Alemanno, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the 
Parliamentary Dimension of Regulatory Cooperation 25 (2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
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Trade negotiators then tried to craft mutual recognition agreements that 
would address technical and other nontariff barriers to trade.32 Essentially, 
negotiators tried to create TABD’s transatlantic marketplace in one swift 
stroke with what domestic administrations perceived as heterodox legal tools. 
Critics viewed the list of deliverables as overly bureaucratic and failing to 
address and solve major trade obstacles in the realm of regulatory cooperation. 
In addition, more pressing foreign policy issues in the Balkans and China 
pushed the transatlantic relationship lower on the trade agenda.33 
B. The MRAs under the Leadership of the European Commission 
In the late 1990s, regulatory cooperation under the rubric of 
“harmonization” appeared as a natural outgrowth of EU law, in which a 
supranational administrative law coordinated the legal regimes of its member 
states and their regulatory compatibility.34 The EU represents one of the world’s 
most extensive efforts to coordinate regulatory standards across levels of 
governments that demonstrated wide expertise in creating better cooperation 
among different regulators. As the evolving supranational regulatory 
environment in the EU changed the expectations of firms in both the EU and 
United States, the political institutions on each side of the Atlantic magnified 
these public pressures for greater cooperative regulation to achieve trade 
liberalization.35 
In 1996, the Chicago Conference issued a declaration stating that “certain 
regulatory requirements, in particular duplicative testing and certification 
procedures and widely divergent technical regulations and standards, were no 
longer sustainable in terms of resources or results and were not suited to the 
realities of the global marketplace.”36 In 1997, TABD issued a priorities paper 
noting “several sectors consider completion of a [MRA] package to be a key 
demonstration of the effectiveness of the TABD process.”37 In May 1997, an 
agreement on conformity assessment was released.38 This mutual recognition 
agreement meant “once a product receives a stamp of approval on one side of 
the Atlantic, it could be automatically sold on the other side as well.”39 
In May 1998, the EU and the United States launched the Transatlantic 
Economic Partnership (TEP) with the aim of furthering bilateral relations with 
 
RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/433847/EXPOAFET_ET(2014)433847_EN.pdf.   
 32.  Tyson Barker, For Transatlantic Trade, This Time Is Different: Why the Latest U.S.–EU Trade 
Talks Are Likely to Succeed, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Feb. 26, 2013). 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  See generally PETER LINDSETH, POWER AND LEGITIMACY 150 (2010).  
 35.  VOGEL, supra note 20, at 59.  
 36.  Id. at 8. 
 37.  Id.  
 38.  VOGEL, BARRIERS OR BENEFITS: REGULATION IN TRANSATLANTIC TRADE 12 (1997). 
 39.  Id. (citing Brian Coleman, U.S., EU Draft Pact on Trade-Product Standards, WALL ST. J. (May 
29, 1997)).  
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an “ambitious” program of regulatory cooperation.40 “The TEP Action Plan 
called for action to address technical barriers to trade in goods, including 
improving the dialogue between EU and U.S. regulators. On the basis of the 
TEP Action Plan, the Commission and the U.S. government developed 
Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency,” encouraging 
agency-to-agency cooperation between regulatory authorities on both sides.41 
The aim was to achieve greater convergence of technical rules through a 
number of sectoral or vertical and horizontal regulatory dialogues.42 Meanwhile, 
intense academic discussions on the possibility of borrowing administrative 
cultures sought to transplant regulatory practices from one side of the Atlantic 
to the other.43 
For instance, in 1997, during the negotiation of several MRAs, lawyers 
relied on a principle that was directly borrowed from the Commission’s notion 
of mutual recognition. For the Commission, inspired by the European Court of 
Justice Judgement of Cassis de Dijon (1979), mutual recognition became central 
to solving the obstacles of transatlantic regulatory cooperation.44 Rather than 
requiring further harmonization, mutual recognition required recognition of 
each other’s certification of products, focusing on the results of conformity 
assessment procedures and presupposing equivalence between respective 
regulatory standards.45 If “managed,” mutual recognition entails that products 
are only tested once for similar processing and can freely circulate between 
trading partners.46 
Even though mutual recognition could advance regulatory cooperation, it is 
not a form of standards recognition, because it does not affect the substance of 
the regulation.47 Even though MRAs covered a broad variety of products 
 
 40.  Mark Pollack, The New Transatlantic Agenda at Ten: Reflections on an Experiment in 
International Governance, 43 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 899, 907 (2005). 
 41.  EU–USA Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 30. 
 42.  Tamara Takacs, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation in Trade: Objectives, Challenges and 
Instruments for Economic Governance, in A TRANSATLANTIC COMMUNITY OF LAW: LEGAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EU AND US LEGAL ORDERS 158, 170–73 
(Elaine Fahey & Deirdre Curtin eds., 2014). 
 43.  Francesca Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European Community Rulemaking: A Call for 
Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT’L L. J. 451, 451–56 (1999). 
 44.  See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral A.G. v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 1979 
E.C.R. 00649; Gerhard Lohan, Integrating Regulatory Cooperation into the EU System, in 
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS  
405–30 (George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2000). Lohan speaks 
particularly to production methods, performance and design requirements, testing and conformity 
assessment, labeling, and recycling and waste management. 
 45.  Alemanno, supra note 31, at 32. 
 46.  See Kalypso Nicolaïdes, Kir Forever? The Journey of a Political Scientist in the Landscape of 
Mutual Recognition, in THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU LAW: THE CLASSICS OF EU LAW REVISITED 
ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ROME TREATY (Miguel Poiares Maduro & Loïc Azoulai eds., 
2010). 
 47.  See Tamara Takacs, Regulatory Cooperation in Transatlantic Trade Relations, in TRADE 
LIBERALISATION AND STANDARDISATION—NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE ‘LOW POLITICS’ OF EU 
FOREIGN POLICY 75, 83 (Marisa Cremona & Tamara Takacs eds., 2013). 
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included in the six sectoral annexes (telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, 
electronics, electromagnetic compatibility, sport boats, and medical devices), 
these agreements succeeded in increasing market access for some goods but not 
for others. As many noticed, a highly managed mutual recognition was “far 
from automatic” and still required cumbersome procedures in its application.48 
In several cases, described in great detail in Gregory Shaffer’s work, the 
failure of implementation of the agreements in areas important for EU 
exporters (electrical safety, medical devices, and pharmaceuticals) created 
transatlantic tensions between the trading partners.49 As a result, MRAs were 
not as successful in EU–U.S. relations as was mutual recognition adopted by the 
Commission within the EU Internal Market.50 
The lesson was that existing regulatory divergences ought to be taken 
seriously to show that there are different regulatory regimes, cultures, and 
preferences at stake, so that rather than a harmonization approach, regulators 
ought to justify their own choices while being open to experimentation. 
Through the MRAs and later on with the 2000 Safe Harbor Privacy Principles, 
the EU model of regulatory cooperation was slowly influencing U.S. regulatory 
approaches so that regulatory convergence “tended toward EC—and not 
U.S.—regulatory practices.”51 Among the reasons, as Shaffer puts it, was the 
ability of the Commission derived from its practical experience to work in a 
multiplicity of languages and national administrative cultures, as well as in the 
growing EU market power.52 
The MRAs successfully globalized a model based on the argument of 
enhanced administrability and allowed flexibility in reconciling cultural and 
technological challenges. In addition, MRAs rejected the attack from the Left, 
well-known in European circles, that while mutual recognition alleviated the 
harmonization burden, it triggered a race to the bottom within the internal 
market. As scholars have shown, mutual recognition came “in differently 
shaped bottles” depending on the political and legal elites negotiating the 
agreements and on the historical meanings of Cassis understood as a managed 
mutual recognition idea.53 Regardless of its success during this round of the 
transatlantic negotiations, the Commission secured a first-mover advantage 
with respect to its U.S. counterparts. 
C. The High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum under the U.S. Leadership 
With the creation of the EU–U.S. HLRCF in 2005, agencies on both sides of 
 
 48.  See Nicolaïdes, supra note 46, at 453 (explaining how mutual trust and technical harmonization 
comes in “differently shaped bottles” and also “in shades of red”). 
 49.  See Shaffer, supra note 18, at 29; see also Mark A. Pollack & Gregory C. Shaffer, Who 
Governs?, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 287, 303 (2001). 
 50. Alemanno, supra note 31, at 31.  
 51. Shaffer, supra note 18). 
 52.  Shaffer, supra note 49, at 41.  
 53.  See Christian Joerges, The Challenges of Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea 
for New Legal Discipline, 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 149 (2004); Nicolaïdis, supra note 46, at  447. 
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the Atlantic aimed to strengthen the exchange of best regulatory practice across 
specific sectors. “The dialogue helps bridge gaps where responsibilities in the 
two administrations do not correspond exactly, and allows for early engagement 
on new emerging regulatory issues.”54 The HLRCF was co-chaired by the 
Director-General of Enterprise and Industry at the Commission and the 
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) in the White House.55 The HLRCF also 
engaged with stakeholders in public sessions, which now form part of its regular 
meetings. These sessions informed businesses and consumers about the results 
of the HLRCF’s work while providing a platform for stakeholders to engage in 
discussions with officials from both sides.56 By referring to horizontal 
cooperation on cross-cutting issues, as opposed to vertical or sector-specific 
issues, the HLRCF sanctioned horizontal regulatory cooperation as part of its 
mission. This dialogue among regulators focused on a variety of bilateral 
activities to share information, ideas on “better” regulatory approaches, 
methods of regulatory analysis, and reform.57 
The Bush Administration sought to break down regulatory barriers in 
transatlantic trade. Allied with Chancellor Merkel in Germany, the Bush 
Administration successfully established the Transatlantic Economic Council 
(TEC). This high-level political body aimed to promote economic integration 
within the Framework for Advancing Transatlantic Economic Integration.58 The 
TEC was meant to bring U.S. and EU economies together, “primarily through 
regulatory cooperation in areas from accounting to electric vehicles and 
nanotechnology.”59 Even though TEC has achieved results in select areas, these 
have not met expectations due to insufficient political support and the effort 
quickly failed over a dispute on the infamous issue of the United States 
exporting chlorine-washed chicken.60 
The road to TTIP began in November 2011 when “the EU–U.S. High Level 
Working Group on Jobs and Growth (HLWG) established by TEC was tasked 
to identify and assess options for strengthening the EU–U.S. economic 
relationship, including opportunities for enhancing the compatibility of 
regulations and standards.”61 The Obama Administration was simultaneously 
reaching out to other trading partners to explore bilateral regulatory 
cooperation.62 In May 2012, the presidential EO 13,609 on IRC was announced 
 
 54.  Europe, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira_irc_europe (last visited 
Dec. 31, 2014). 
 55.  Office of Management and Budget, Europe: United States–European Union High-Level 
Regulatory Cooperation Forum (2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira_irc_europe. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Alemanno, supra note 31, at 28. 
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Barker, supra note 32. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  EU–USA Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 30.  
 62.  Christopher Sands, Harmonizing the Border: Increase Jobs by Harmonizing Regulations: 
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at the joint Administrative Conference of the United States and the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce workshop.63 The order was based in part on ACUS 
Recommendation 2011-6 and required all executive agencies to consider 
international cooperation in all of their regulatory functions.64 
By February 2013, HLWG released its final report; two days later, President 
Obama, the President of the EC, and the President of the Commission, 
announced that they would launch a negotiation with the aim of achieving a 
comprehensive transatlantic trade agreement.65 Negotiations began in mid-2013. 
During the second round of negotiations, concluded on November 15, 2013, 
“both sides agreed on the importance of horizontal rules and specific 
commitments in sectors.”66 Since then, horizontal cooperation addressing IRC 
architecture and mechanisms has become an extremely technical issue under 
the prerogative of administrative lawyers. 
The new institutional framework that trade negotiators have put forward for 
the emerging megaregional free trade agreements ranging from TPP, TTIP, and 
the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement between Canada and the 
EU relies on a modest administrative and implementation structure geared 
toward facilitating regulatory cooperation rather than new regulations. In this 
respect negotiators and lawyers alike have spent a lot of effort to define the 
term “regulatory cooperation” as something different from and more flexible 
than “convergence” or “harmonization” as used profusely by the EU and the 
WTO. 
In May 2015, the EU draft of the horizontal chapter aimed to promote 
regulatory cooperation through improved regulatory exchange of information, 
commitment to good regulatory practices, and the creation of a long-term 
institutional framework.67 In its proposal the Commission endorses the creation 
of a regulatory cooperation body, which would facilitate exchange of 
information through early warnings in order to avoid unnecessary 
incompatibilities. The regulatory cooperation body will monitor and review the 
implementation of regulation in the different sectors included in TTIP and 
identify new opportunities for cooperation.68 Even though such a body will not 
 
Restoring Respect for the Law in Canada–U.S. Commerce: The Regulatory Cooperation Council So Far, 
37 CAN.–U.S. L. J. 319, 319–20 (2012). 
 63.  International Regulatory Cooperation, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES—RESEARCH PROJECTS, http://www.acus.gov/research-projects/international-regulatory-
cooperation (last visited Dec. 31, 2014). 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  EU–U.S. High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf (last visited Sept 10, 2015). 
 66.  A Second Round TTIP Concludes, WASH. TRADE DAILY, Nov. 18, 2013, at 1. 
 67.  See Detailed Explanation on the EU Proposal for a Chapter on Regulatory Cooperation, EUR. 
COMM’N (May 6, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153431.1.1%20Detail 
%20explanation%20of%20the%20EU%20proposal%20for%20a%20Chapter%20of%20reg%20coop.
pdf.  
 68.  See Articles 14–16, Establishment of the Regulatory Cooperation Body in the Commissions’ 
Initial Provisions for Regulatory Cooperation, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/ 
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have the power to adopt legal acts,69 scholars and civil society groups have 
raised all sorts of issues with regard to its composition, its transparency, and its 
authority vis-à-vis domestic or EU decision-making processes.70 
III 
REGULATORY TOOLS AND IDEOLOGICAL CONFLICTS IN IRC 
A. Negative versus Positive List and the Race to the Bottom 
For some scholars, IRC consists of a set of instruments for multinational 
corporations and for small and medium enterprises to reduce the cost of 
compliance with multiple sets of product regulations and standards across 
different economies.71 Through more effective government regulations, IRC 
exists to allow businesses to more efficiently engage in international trade.72 
Within this definition, nothing limits the set of means employed to achieve 
IRC.73 Considered broadly, such means can include the study, design, 
monitoring, enforcement, and ex post management of regulations, whether in 
binding or voluntary forms.74 In addition, the forms of IRC can vary in type 
while taking different forms: from regulatory convergence to harmonization, 
from mutual recognition of regulations across borders to coordination or 
cooperation in the form of joint study, and from mere information exchange to 
generally thoughtful consideration of trading partners.75 
Irrespective of the existence of transatlantic institutions and dialogues for 
regulatory cooperation, the challenges to overcome regulatory differences 
remain substantial.76 A significant example that has emerged in the TTIP 
negotiation was the different approach to liberalization used by trade 
negotiators. The USTR follows a “negative list approach” that explicitly 
mentions the restrictions that ought to be eliminated: the so-called “list it or 
lose it” approach often criticized by labor groups.77 In contrast, the EU uses a 
“positive list approach,” which aims to stimulate broader market access 
commitments that leave open the inclusion of new topics during the 
 
tradoc_153120.pdf. 
 69.  Commission Introduction to the EU Legal Text on Regulatory Cooperation in TTIP (Feb. 10, 
2015),http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/tradoc_153119.1.1%20Regulatory%20cooper
ation%20intro%20to%20EU%20legal%20text.pdf.   
 70.  See Meuwese, supra note 7, at 10–11. 
 71.  RAYMOND J. AHEARN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34717, TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY 
COOPERATION: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 4 (2009). 
 72.  IRC has also been defined as efficiency gains “without the use of additional resources,” which 
seems unrealistically limiting, given the obvious investments of government resources in IRC. Adam C. 
Schlosser & Reeve T. Bull, Regulatory Cooperation in the TTIP, REG BLOG (Aug. 27, 2013), 
http://www.regblog.org/2013/08/27/27-schlosser-reeve-ttip/. 
 73.  OECD, infra note 101 at 22–25. 
 74.  Id.  
 75.  Bermann, supra note 16, at 14. 
 76.  Egan, supra note 8. 
 77.  Id. 
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negotiations.78 
In the context of TTIP, the EU has proposed a hybrid approach for trade in 
services, using positive listing for market access and negative listing for national 
treatment.79 The USTR, however, has used a negative listing for services in the 
past and appears to support a negative listing in TTIP as well.80 One issue of 
contention was the audiovisual sector, because under the negative list approach, 
negotiators would not have known what future technological developments may 
be included in current concessions.81 Such contention led the European 
Parliament, influenced by industries as well as governments under the lead of 
France, to convince the Commission that the audiovisual sector should be 
excluded from the vertical competences of TTIP.82 
Scholars, politicians, and civil society groups in the EU and in the United 
States, however, have feared that transatlantic regulatory cooperation enhances 
a race to the bottom scenario in which exporting corporations will be able to 
take advantage of trade agreements to move their operations freely to the most 
favorable, or least stringent, of several regulatory jurisdictions, while continuing 
to export to all.83 At the same time, the affected regulators must compete to 
reduce the stringency of their standards or risk lost competiveness or the loss of 
operations.84 In the United States, officials and lawmakers have opposed 
including provisions regulating financial services into trade agreements such as 
the TTIP out of the concern that including this sector will weaken existing U.S. 
safeguards such as the Dodd–Frank Act, resulting in a race to the bottom.85 
The potential for a race to the bottom is typically explored in the context of 
corporate interests over environmental regulations, consumer-protections, and 
public-sector services86 but applies to any area in which corporate interests 
might overwhelm regulatory stringency. In the EU, the privatization of 
 
 78.  Id. at 5. 
 79.  Len Bracken, EU’s Leaked Services Offer for TTIP Seen As Possible Complication in 
Negotiations, INTERNATIONAL TRADE DAILY (July 14, 2014). 
 80.  EUROPEAN COMMISSION, UPDATE ON THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
PARTNERSHIP (TTIP)–FIRST NEGOTIATION ROUND 4 (2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/ 
2013/july/tradoc_151656.pdf. 
 81.   Bracken, supra note 79. 
 82.  Monika Ermert, Brief: Controversial Debate on TTIP Mandate in EU Council of Ministers, 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. WATCH (June 14, 2013), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/06/14/audiovisual-sector-
out-of-eu-mandate-for-ttip/. 
 83.  See Gabriel Siles-Brugge, ‘Race to the Bottom’ or Setting Global Standards? Assessing the 
Regulatory Impact of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), REAL INSTITUTO 
ELCANO (Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido? 
WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari42-2014-silesbrugge-assessing-regulatory 
-impact-ttip. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  On the exceptionalism of financial services in TTIP, see Inu Barbee & Simone Lester, 
Financial Services in the TTIP: Making the Prudential Exception Work, 45 GEORGETOWN J. INT’L L. 
953 (2014). For the position of U.S. Treasury on TTIP, see Jamila Trindle & Tom Fairless, U.S. Wants 
Financial Services Off Table in EU Trade Talks, WALL ST. J., (July 15, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323394504578607841246434144.  
 86. Randall, infra note 98. 
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healthcare and public services or utilities has created a great push back against 
TTIP.87 In the United Kingdom, this discussion has focused on the impact TTIP 
may have on the U.K. National Healthcare Service with the fear that the 
agreement would “lock-in” the neoliberal reforms introduced by the Cameron 
Administration.88 The Commission’s response through a letter leaked to the 
public has been to reassure such actors that the provision of public services will 
be sufficiently protected in TTIP.89 Yet scholars have shown that the 
mobilization of U.K. civil society against TTIP vis-à-vis the health sector was so 
well-organized due to the prior mobilization under Prime Minister Cameron 
against healthcare reform.90 
In essence, the race to the bottom critique warns of the damage of 
unchecked corporate influence over regulatory processes, with minimal thought 
to the power of other constituencies, primarily citizens. In response, scholars 
have argued that the race to the bottom critique simply overestimates the 
influence of corporations relative to that of the public interest in regulatory 
processes.91 Others have argued that with respect to global regulatory standards, 
exporters “have conformed their goods or services to the most stringent rules” 
of their largest customers.92 
B. Regulatory Efficiency versus Democratic Participation 
Whereas in past decades, scholarly debates about the normative desirability 
of IRC have blossomed among administrative lawyers,93 a difference in the TPP 
and TTIP negotiations is that politicians and civil society have been much more 
vocal about the lack of democratic participation in IRC, especially in 
megaregional free trade agreements. These concerns had been put forward by 
scholars focusing on how IRC restrains the already limited possibility of public 
 
 87.  Holly Jarman, Trade Policymaking Meets Social Policies: Public Statements on Healthcare and 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, http://www.icpublicpolicy.org/conference/file/ 
reponse/1435225750.pdf. 
 88. Id.  
 89.  See Letter from Ignacio Garcia Bercero to Rt. Hon. John Healey, Chair, All-Party 
Parliamentary Group on TTIP (July 8, 2014), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/july/ 
tradoc_152665.pdf. 
 90.  Jarman, supra note 87.  
 91.  VOGEL, supra note 20, at 57. After a survey of U.S. and EU trade issues, he states,  
There does not appear to be a single instance in which either the United States or the EU 
lowered any health, safety, or environmental standard to make its domestic producers more 
competitive. . . . On the contrary, standards have moved steadily, if unevenly, upward on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 
 92.  See Thomas J. Bollyky & Anu Bradford, Getting to Yes on Transatlantic Trade, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS (July 10, 2013), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139569/thomas-j-bollyky-and-anu-
bradford/getting-to-yes-on-transatlantic-trade (demonstrating how EU rules on privacy and 
competition have set high global standards, as have U.S. regulations on financial services). 
 93.  Francesca Bignami, The Challenge of Cooperative Regulatory Relations after Enlargement, in 
LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN AN ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION (George A. Bermann & Katharina 
Pistor eds., 2004), http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1249&context= 
faculty_publications. 
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participation in regulatory processes. Transatlantic regulatory cooperation 
justified by the need for greater efficiency added an international layer to 
domestic regulatory processes with little basis in democratic procedures. 
Therefore, many commentators share the view that the central challenge of IRC 
under the pressure of more effective regulation is to find “new democratic 
forms to match the new global realities.”94 
A variety of scholars have proposed solutions to the problem of the erosion 
of democratic accountability in IRC. Ludger Kühnhardt has suggested that “the 
development of democratic mechanisms outside the confines of the nation state 
will, as the EU experience demonstrates, likely be an evolutionary process”—
hard to foster in the international context.95 Robert Howse suggests instead that 
“allowing persons in different jurisdictions to test the quality of domestic 
decision-making against alternative regimes elsewhere” could replace 
democratic mechanisms to legitimize IRC in a kind of competitive federalism.96 
From a different perspective, Sol Picciotto offered a “‘directly deliberative’ 
model of democracy in the face of IRC, based upon forms of active citizenship, 
political action, and conscious pursuit of such ‘constitutive’ principles as 
transparency, accountability, responsibility, and empowerment.”97 The nature of 
IRC diluting the democratic accountability of regulatory processes raises 
additional substantive issues. If “the international factor” consists of maximal 
corporate influence posited by certain public interest groups,98 or the maximal 
influence of “international elites” (a more common suspicion among 
academics),99 different methods to reconcile accountability with IRC will be 
required. 
For others, transatlantic regulatory cooperation offers the ability to address 
countries’ common regulatory problems.100 Many problems that national 
 
 94.  Bermann, supra note 16, at 11; see also Robert Howse, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation 
and the Problem of Democracy, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: LEGAL 
PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS  469–80 (George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen & Peter L. 
Lindseth eds., 2000); Sol Picciotto, North Atlantic Cooperation and Democratizing Globalism, in 
TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL PROSPECTS 
495–519 (George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2000).  
 95.  Ludger Kühnhardt, Globalization, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation, and Democratic 
Values, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: LEGAL PROBLEMS AND POLITICAL 
PROSPECTS 481 (George A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2000).  
 96.  Howse, supra note 94. 
 97.  Picciotto, supra note 94. 
 98.  Jessica Randall, International Regulatory Cooperation: Will Harmonization Protect the Public 
or Prioritize Corporate Profits?, CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (May 3, 2012),  
http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/12071. She writes:  
In a disturbing example [of corporate influence], “stakeholder presentations”—the only 
opportunity for public input—were recently eliminated from the meetings surrounding the 
negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but corporations and industry 
representatives are still being invited to participate in the TPP talks. In fact, the U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce—which vigorously supports legislation to undercut public protections—boasts 
that its recommendations formed the basis for the U.S. negotiating positions.  
 99.  See Picciotto, supra note 94. 
 100.  Id.   
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regulations attempt to address are either beyond the capability of any individual 
country to regulate effectively alone or can be controlled more effectively 
through cooperative processes.101 Pollution or other environmental damage is an 
obvious example of transnational social costs that are not easily allocated. 
Pollution that crosses national boundaries is beyond the scope of any national 
regulation or regulator to address. More subtle collective-action problems also 
arise within the reach of domestic regulation. As trade scholars have suggested, 
entrenched deference to technocratic rulemaking by specialized agencies can 
permanently undercut the development of globally sensitive, normative 
guidance in the development of international standards.102 
In other words, even when the subject of regulation is on a domestic scale, it 
might be hard or impossible for national regulators to remove inefficiencies 
without a larger normative intent and without formal coordination with other 
nations cooperating on the same project. Due to rapid technological 
transformation, however, scholars have shown that more “sustained regulatory 
exchange can enhance informed decision-making.”103 This has become one of 
the central arguments in the TTIP negotiation, especially in sectors where 
global standards could diverge, thereby creating losses for businesses and 
regulatory conflicts. Yet for some scholars an improved transatlantic 
information exchange in standard-setting could ensure regulatory overlap while 
avoiding regulatory failures and maintaining democratic accountability.104 
C. Soft versus Hard Law in Administrative Law 
Friction has also emerged between the EU and the U.S. approaches to 
transatlantic cooperation over the choice of regulatory tools. Recommendations 
and best practices reinstating the relevance of transparency, openness, and 
participation in rulemaking initially favored the use of soft law.105 Whether the 
EU has more frequently used its “soft power” or is an effective global standard-
setting actor, many scholars have argued that it does so through a particularly 
cooperative and soft approach. This approach could be described as a middle 
ground between laissez-faire and socialism, or what Gráinne de Búrca has 
described as a “third-way model of social democracy as an alternative means of 
managing economic globalization.”106 
 
 101.   OECD, INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: ADDRESSING GLOBAL 
CHALLENGES 13 (2013). 
 102.  See Joel P. Trachtman, Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation from a Trade Perspective: A Case 
Study in Accounting Standards, in TRANSATLANTIC REGULATORY CO-OPERATION 223–42 (George 
A. Bermann, Matthias Herdegen & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2000) (examining the inhibiting effect that 
regulatory diversity in accounting standards has had on international trade). 
 103.  See Pollack & Shaffer, supra note 49. 
 104.  Bollyky & Bradford, supra note 92. 
 105.  U.S.–EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON REGULATORY PRINCIPLES 
AND BEST PRACTICES (2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/common-
understanding-on-regulatory-principles-and-best-practices.pdf.   
 106.  See Grainne de Burca, Europe’s Raison D’Etre 11 (N.Y.U. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-09, 2013).  
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For instance, soft law was at the center of MRAs in transatlantic regulatory 
cooperation that allowed certain industry sectors to set common procedural 
baselines for standard settings for their products that initially could not freely 
circulate among EU Member States.107 MRAs were in fact based on the 
willingness of the parties to share information and reach closer cooperation 
while avoiding hard implementation measures or penalties for the failure to 
implement them.108 In addition, the Commission has put forward its preference 
for Agency-to-Agency cooperation, allowing independent agencies to 
coordinate and exchange information at different phases and through formal or 
informal relations. 
In contrast to the EU’s soft-law approach, the USTR has proposed a 
centralized supervision of IRC similar to that of the OMB in the White 
House.109 This Office, supervising other agencies, would directly bind other 
operators to function under a set of administrative principles, such as cost-
benefit analysis or the notice-and-comment rulemaking processes as a way to 
allow stakeholders to offer individual feedback to regulation.110 
Another example of institutional innovation through hard law is the Office 
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), a federal agency created in 
1980 that is part of the OMB and falls under the President’s direction.111 In 
practice, however, agencies sometimes use different strategies to avoid OIRA’s 
widespread review to dodge political conflicts or onerous procedures that lead 
to a complex dynamic of avoidance and cooperation depending on the 
administrative actors and circumstances.112 In the leaked chapter on regulatory 
coherence of the TPP, there was a clear attempt by the USTR to encourage 
other governments to adopt an OIRA-style mechanism. The impulse to create a 
central body with higher status was geared to better coordinate, under the 
direction of the executive branch, the development of regulation, the decision-
making processes in the agencies, and the implementation of good regulatory 
practices based on a standardized cost-benefit analysis and Regulatory Impact 
 
 107.  See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 
I-649; see also EU Position Paper, EU-US Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Technical 
Barriers to Trade, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151627.pdf. 
 108.  Shaffer, supra note 18. 
 109.  See TiIPING Point, The Regulatory Component, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Feb. 25, 2015, 
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/documents/files/021460_TTIP_Regulatory_Paper_FIN.p
df. For an opposite perspective about the increasing and distorting power of OMB, see TACD, 
Resolution on Regulatory Coherence in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Doc. 16/13, 
(December 2013), http://test.tacd.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/TACD-TTIP-Resolution-on-
Regulatory-Coherence-in-the-Transatlantic-Trade-and-Investment-Partnership.pdf. 
 110.  Takacs, supra note 47, at 87. 
 111.  OIRA was created by Congress in the 1980s under the Carter Administration. Later on with 
President Reagan’s EO 12,291, OIRA became an effective centralizing supervisor of agency 
rulemaking by requiring cost-benefit analyses for a wide range of proposed rules. About OIRA, THE 
WHITE HOUSE—OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira/about (last 
visited Nov. 28, 2015). 
 112.  Nina A. Mendelson & Jonathan B. Wiener, Responses to Agency Avoidance of OIRA, 37 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 447 (2014). 
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Assessments.113 
In both TPP and TTIP negotiations, the USTR has put forward its 
administrative and regulatory apparatus as exemplary for other negotiating 
parties due to its centralized and participatory procedures. For instance, the 
U.S. administration prides itself on its notice-and-comment process to agency 
rulemaking that ensures a high level of participation ranging from economic 
actors to civil society at large while requiring agencies to take into consideration 
the public comments under the threat of litigation. Although in practice this 
process does not entail “effective” opportunities for participation—agencies are 
not required to monitor participation and “solicit underrepresented groups”—
at least at the negotiation table USTR can put forward its notice-and-comment 
process as a hard model for regulatory participation.114 
Beyond the hard-versus-soft-law divide, IRC requires a high level of 
administrative law expertise and EU–U.S. comparative studies, which are often 
sponsored by the main actors. This expertise allows trade negotiators to use 
technical and neutral tools as a way to avoid more overtly political issues, such 
as addressing how the costs and benefits of free-trade agreements are 
redistributed in practice.115 
IV 
FROM GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TO GLOBAL EXPERIMENTAL 
GOVERNANCE 
A. Global Administrative Law and Its Critics 
One of the challenges for IRC remains how to achieve regulatory 
convergence or cooperation by translating broad global governance principles 
into divergent administrative cultures. In principle, trade negotiators might 
have converging aspirations of what appear to be “best” administrative law 
practices and institutional arrangements. Scholars of GAL have put forward an 
ambitious set of administrative law principles by taking the regulatory regime 
created by the WTO as a model. GAL scholars begin with the premise that the 
forces of globalization are gradually altering the international legal order and 
 
 113.  TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT (TPP)—REGULATORY COHERENCE, as 
published by CITIZENS TRADE CAMPAIGN, http://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-
content/uploads/2011/10/TransPacificRegulatoryCoherence.pdf.   
 114.  See Wendy Wagner, Participation in US Administrative Process, in FRANCESCA BIGNAMI AND 
DAVID ZARING, ELGAR HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION (forthcoming 2016). 
 115.  See RICHARD PARKER & ALBERT ALEMANNO, COMMISSION REPORT—TOWARDS 
EFFECTIVE REGULATORY COOPERATION UNDER TTIP: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE EU 
AND US LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY SYSTEMS 65 (2014), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152466.pdf (“The challenge for TTIP 
negotiators is to find an effective mechanism for enabling these two disparate systems to work more 
effectively, efficiently, and cooperatively together. That exploration will be aided by a clear 
understanding of how the two legislative and regulatory systems work currently in their separate 
spheres.”). 
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that much of this change is regulatory and administrative in nature.116 
For proponents of GAL, areas as diverse as United Nations Security 
Council decisions on asset freezing, World Bank rulemaking, and Financial 
Action Task Force standard-setting are all equal evidence that international 
institutions are aggressively asserting their reach into the domestic realm 
through general principles such as transparency, accountability, and 
participation. However, these global administrative law principles trickle down 
in ways that challenge the traditional distinction between domestic and 
international law.117 As such, GAL “encompasses procedures and normative 
standards for regulatory decisionmaking that falls outside domestic legal 
structures and yet is not properly covered by existing international law, which 
traditionally governs state-to-state relations rather than the exercise of 
regulatory authority with direct or indirect effects on individuals.”118 
The first set of criticisms raised against GAL focused on the rise in power 
and influence of international regulatory regimes and the resulting 
accountability gaps, as well as important changes to domestic law that bypass 
traditional domestic political and legal limitations.119 This happens when global 
regimes lacking domestic accountability adopt regulatory norms, which are then 
implemented through domestic regulation. Changes to domestic regulations 
often circumvent the traditional requirement of state consent through treaties 
because they “operate below or outside the treaty system.”120 
In response, proponents of GAL have put forward a bottom-up extension of 
domestic administrative law principles to the international level.121 In reaction to 
demands for accountability in a globalized world, GAL scholars have proposed 
to make global administrative decisions more reasoned rather than more 
democratic,122 whereas others have called upon national administrations to 
respect procedural global standards while reconciling them with domestic 
standard.123 
Another critique leveled against GAL was that it reflected Western 
 
 116.  See Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global 
Administrative Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2006). 
 117.  Id. at 3.  
 118.  Simon Chesterman, Globalization Rules: Accountability, Power and the Prospects for Global 
Administrative Law, 14 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 39, 39 (2008). 
 119.  Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global Administrative Law?, 68 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 69 (Summer/Autumn 2005).  
 120.  See Richard B. Stewart, The Global Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative Law, 37 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 695, 695 (2005). 
 121.  See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 17 (2005) (defining GAL as comprising the 
mechanisms, principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that promote or otherwise 
affect the accountability of global administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring they meet adequate 
standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality, and by providing effective 
review of the rules and decisions they make). 
 122.  Chesterman, supra note 118, at 39–40. 
 123.  Sabino Cassese, Global Standards for National Administrative Procedure, 68 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110–11 (2005). 
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conceptions of administrative law, thus dismissing developing nations’ legal 
regimes. The principles GAL embodies have their origins in the rise of the 
liberal state and the expansion of regulatory functions in the late nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries, and these origins may be difficult to transplant to other 
parts of the world.124 GAL was similarly criticized for its form of “imperialism” 
that mainly benefited Northern industrialized countries at the expense of the 
rest of the world.125 B.S. Chimini, for example, argued, “GAL is today being 
shaped by a [Transnational Capitalist Class] that seeks to legitimize unequal 
laws and institutions and deploy it to its advantage.”126 However, even within 
the West, there is considerable diversity in the ways national regulators 
approach the basic administrative law principles that form the core of GAL.127 
Critics and proponents have rejected the assumption that GAL, taken to its 
logical conclusion, suggests that national administrative procedures will 
converge over time as general principles of Western administrative law spread 
through the implementation of agreements negotiated under international 
regulatory regimes.128 Both debates spurred by these concerns about GAL show 
that the operationalization of global administrative principles entails 
cooperation and political compromises that are contextual to the specific set of 
institutions and interests at stake. 
B. Experimental and Problem-Solving Approaches to Global Governance 
Critics of global regulation argue that regulatory variation allows for 
experimentation by which states can learn about the impacts of different 
policies. These experiments might include policy variation in practice, 
diversification as protection from errors, innovative experimentation, and 
studying transitions over time from variation to convergence. 
A new theory supporting this idea, mentioned briefly in part I, supra, is 
GXG. This is conceptualized as an institutionalized process of participatory and 
multilevel collective problem-solving, where problems are framed in an open-
ended way and subject to review in light of local knowledge.129 For GXG to 
 
 124.  Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 121, at 51. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  See B.S. Chimni, Cooption and Resistance: Two Faces of Global Administrative Law 7 (Inst. 
Int’l Law and Justice, Working Paper No. 2005/16, 2005), 
http://www.iilj.org/publications/2005WorkingPapers.asp; see also Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra 
note 121, at 51 (“[A]n international order based on individual or economic rights may be too close to a 
Western, liberal conceptions to be universally acceptable.”); Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of Global 
Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 247, 248 (2006) (arguing that forcing global governance into a 
coherent and unified framework is normatively undesirable). 
 127.  See Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values, 17 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 187, 193, 208 (2006). 
 128.  See John Bell, Mechanisms for Cross-Fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe, in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 147 (Jack Beatson & Takis Tridmas eds.,1998) (identifying 
the ways in which administrative law is converging and diverging between countries).  
 129.  Grainne de Burca, Robert O. Keohane & Charles F. Sabel, Global Experimentalist 
Governance 2 (N.Y.U. Sch. Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-
44, 2014).  
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occur, multiple deliberation-fostering steps must take place.130 Proponents of 
GXG advocate horizontal sectoral agreements to create a transatlantic 
regulatory laboratory that could be implemented in TTIP. For example, within 
a country, the federal government can monitor different policy implementations 
in various states and adopt the best policy to apply to all. However, the 
international legal community lacks a central government able to monitor, 
assess, and implement these experimental policies. GXG further argues that 
“nested institution at multiple levels can, when linked together in particular 
ways, cohere into an innovative form of learning organization,” placing the 
burden of monitoring and review on peers in a horizontal structure.131 
If GAL fails to account for the potential mismatch between local 
preferences and circumstances—because harmonization discounts local 
governments’ policymaking and preferences—GHX, in contrast, recognizes 
international-trade gains not only from comparative advantages but also by 
acquiring skills across different countries. Regulatory variation could increase 
gains from trade and additional information-sharing by taking into account 
locally formed opinions. However, proponents of GXG outline some of its 
underlying and necessary conditions, such as uncertain and diverse 
environments, commitment of key actors on basic principles, and cooperation 
among newly formed civil society actors as agenda-setters or problem-solvers.132 
In the same vein, Alberto Alemanno and Jonathan Wiener show that 
regulatory variation can be carried out in many different ways to achieve 
learning from variation.133 Differences in impact can be observed and thus 
inform improvement, as in the laboratory of federalism cited by Judge 
Brandeis.134 This approach would be effective on an international scale because 
of the broad variation of approaches. Further, variation could be examined in 
purposeful experimentation from a university research setting to practical 
policies.135 
Alemanno and Wiener address their experimental approach in TTIP under 
the presumption that the penalty for noncooperation is a high economic loss 
and that both the EU and United States share Western administrative law 
values. They argue in favor of an experimentalist laboratory with a central 
governing body that should monitor and select best practices for regulatory 
lawmaking.136 The regulatory cooperation body exemplifies this idea through a 
permanent mechanism that will identify sectors where new regulations may be 
aligned through monitoring and exchanging information on principles, 
 
 130.  Id.  
 131.  Id. at 4. 
 132. Id. at 13. 
 133.  Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International Regulatory 
Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning Process toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 4, 2015, at 132–35.  
 134.  See  New State Ice Co. v Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 135.  Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 133, at 127. 
 136.  Id.at 19–21. 
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procedures on participation, and impact assessments, with the goal of providing 
a gateway to manage any regulatory issues impacting trade.137 This method 
incorporates learning from regulatory variation by addressing regulatory 
divergence as a complex phenomenon. Rather than circumventing 
representative democracy, new institutional and regulatory mechanisms will 
allow the creation of a regulatory laboratory and a living agreement that can be 
modified without reopening the existing agreement between the EU and the 
United States. 
According to these administrative lawyers, experimentalist features will 
induce regulators in the EU and the United States to consider the 
extraterritorial impact of their policies and will lead them to align their 
regulatory outcomes.138 This may occur through mutual recognition of existing 
standards or in relation to new or revised regulations. This transatlantic 
laboratory will further allow regulators to discuss their solutions to different 
administrative practices and to gather public input that is essential for the 
success of their trade and investment partnership at all stages.139 Only then will 
regulators be able to decide whether and how regulations can converge by 
identifying areas that could become legally binding and thus subject to 
enforcement. Experimentalist lawyers aim to reconcile conflicting interests by 
balancing reasons that can universally apply to identify best practices, allowing 
each country to decide if and how regulatory convergence should occur.  
V 
POLITICIZING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW EXPERTISE 
A. Comparative Law Approaches to Market Regulation 
Since its launch, one of the main goals of IRC has been to remove arbitrary 
regulatory differences in domestic administrative approaches.  Lawyers have 
been enlisted with the goal of achieving better regulatory cooperation and 
comparing existing differences and the similarities in regulatory approaches that 
value transparency, openness, and participation. Comparative lawyers have 
highlighted the existence of different European and U.S. approaches to market 
regulation. To show these differences, some have used a “law in the books” 
approach to map the divergence between EU and U.S. regulatory processes, 140 
while others have opted for a “law in context”141 or an “intellectual history” 
approach.142 
 
 137.  See EUROPEAN UNION, TEXTUAL PROPOSAL FOR LEGAL TEXT ON “REGULATORY 
COOPERATION” IN TTIP 11, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/tradoc_153120.pdf. 
 138.  Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 133 at 129–30. 
 139.  Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 133 at 129–31. 
 140.  See Parker & Alemanno, supra note 115. 
 141.  GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO 
LITIGATION (2003).  
 142.  See James Q. Whitman, Consumerism versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law, 117 
YALE L. J. 340, 383–84 (2007). 
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From a law-in-the-books perspective, lawyers have demonstrated a 
fundamental divergence in administrative law regimes.143  Lawyers have focused 
first on the differences existing between primary legislation that encompasses 
bills and legislation, and second, on the differences between secondary 
legislation that encompasses the regulatory process.  They have come to the 
conclusion that in the United States, public participation in primary legislation 
is haphazard, while secondary regulation is exposed to broad input from 
individual stakeholders via the notice-and-comment procedure established to 
make sure that interested individuals can participate in rulemaking.144 In other 
words, administrative agencies adopting secondary legislation though informal 
rulemaking procedures need to offer the public a chance to provide comments 
to the proposed regulations.145 Agencies respond to individual comments from 
stakeholders according to court decisions interpreting the APA or their internal 
statutes. 
In contrast, primary legislation in the EU is the result of broad consultation 
of stakeholders and institutional actors representing institutional market 
actors.146 In the EU, stakeholder input comes much earlier in the process, and 
the institutional stakeholders are largely involved and offer input at the primary 
legislation stage; in the United States, in contrast, individual stakeholders play 
an important role later, during regulatory lawmaking.147 
This divergence in administrative processes also reflects a more “proactive” 
EU approach to market economies as opposed to a more “reactive” U.S. 
approach. To explain such divergence, James Whitman’s work shows how 
European countries, especially France and Germany, have focused on producer 
interests due to the view that the basic problem of law and politics is reconciling 
conflicting interests of different producer groups.148 Consequently, economic 
legislation in the EU has revolved around the conflicts between producer 
groups as well as labor law. In the United States, however, the focus has 
historically been on consumers—members of a universal class sharing a 
common interest in buying things that are “cheap” and “good.”149 
Another example of the divergence in EU–U.S. administrative processes is 
apparent in U.S. antitrust law, in which regulators seek to avoid behavior that 
would undermine individual interests, whereas EU competition law protects 
 
 143.  See Parker & Alemanno, supra note 115 (highlighting fundamental differences in what 
regulators define as primary versus secondary legislation in the EU and the United States). 
 144.  See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 145.   JEFFREY LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 274 (5th ed. 2012). 
 146.  For example, see the feedback solicited from stakeholders by the European Commission on its 
White and Green Papers to initiate, stimulate, and propose legislative action. EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
GREEN PAPERS, http://ec.europa.eu/green-papers/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2015). 
 147.  See Susan E. Dudley and Kay Wegrich, Achieving Regulatory Policy Objectives: An Overview 
and Comparison of U.S. and EU Procedures 33 (2015),http://regulatorystudies.columbian. 
gwu.edu/sites/regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/files/downloads/Dudley-Wegrich_US-
EU_RegOverview.pdf. 
 148.  Whitman, supra note 142. 
 149.  Id. at 361. 
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business interests by preventing distortion of the field by a dominant interest. It 
can be argued that, as a result of these histories, the EU market is dominated by 
institutional participants, whereas individual and business participants dominate 
in the U.S. market. 
In a similar way, through a law-in-context approach, Gregory Shaffer has 
showed how private parties are challenging trade barriers through the WTO 
regime. In foregrounding the cultural and socioeconomic differences among 
private litigants and public officials, Shaffer shows different types of access to 
WTO disputes, with individual businesses in the United States doing most of 
the work rather than a stronger institutional presence like the Commission in 
the EU.150 
Even though comparative lawyers have explained in detail the reasons for 
the existing differences in transatlantic regulatory cooperation, scholars have 
often facilitated and promoted new knowledge for the TTIP negotiation. 
Because legal expertise is increasingly relevant to trade negotiators, what 
initially appeared as a neutral comparison has become a bargaining chip for 
trade negotiators engaging in regulatory cooperation. 
B.  Transparency as a Neutral Principle or a Bargaining Tool 
EU and U.S. trade negotiators alike continuously strive to achieve greater 
transparency in the TTIP negotiation in order to increase the legitimacy of a 
trade negotiation process suffering from an inherent democratic deficit. USTR 
representative Michael Froman stated that “[t]ransparency, participation, 
accountability—these are core to the U.S. regulatory system, but they are not 
uniquely American principles,”151 while his counterpart, EU Trade 
Commissioner Cecilia Malmström, claimed, “I have transparency in my DNA, 
and I hope I can inject it also in TTIP negotiations.”152 
At the declaratory level, convergence exists on the meaning of the principle 
of transparency that each system uses to make its processes more open and 
accountable to the public. This includes the availability and ease of access by 
the public to information held by the government and the ability to observe and 
become informed about regulatory decisionmaking.153 At the abstract level, 
transparency and public participation can promote democratic legitimacy and 
economic efficiency by strengthening the connections between government 
agencies and the public they serve, as well as by enhancing the credibility of 
 
 150.   See SHAFFER, supra note 141. 
 151.  Remarks by US Trade Representative Michael Froman on the United States, the European 
Union, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (Sept. 30, 2013) (transcript available at 
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2013/10/20131001283902.html#axzz3Q4vuUlAm). 
 152.  TTIP, TWITTER.COM, https://twitter.com/search?q=ttip&src=typd. 
 153.  See Cary Coglianese et al., Transparency and Public Participation in the Federal Rulemaking 
Process: Recommendations for the New Administration, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 924, 926 (2009); see 
also Michelle Limenta, Open Trade Negotiations as Opposed to Secret Trade Negotiations: From 
Transparency to Public Participation, 10 N.Z. Y.B. INT’L. L. 73 (2012) (explaining that transparency is 
used widely in many different contexts and that there is no generally acceptable definition of it).  
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trade negotiations.154 
Even though negotiators are committed to transparency and participation 
through the involvement of the U.S. Congress or the European Parliament, in 
the realm of regulatory cooperation and its operationalization, ambiguity 
surrounds the meaning of transparency, openness, and participation in the 
regulatory processes.155 
A central objective of the USTR concerning transparency “is to obtain 
broader application of the principle of transparency and clarification of the 
costs and benefits of trade policy actions.”156 Under this rationale, the USTR has 
tried to implement robust transparency initiatives. In 2014, as a result of various 
pressures from civil society and industries alike, Mr. Froman announced the 
creation of an innovative forum, namely a Public Interest Trade Advisory 
Committee (PITAC) for academics and NGOs, as part of the trade advisory 
committee structure. One of the paradoxical provisions of the PITAC was, 
however, that every participant was obliged to sign a nondisclosure agreement 
so that civil society participants could not openly discuss or promote the 
information they acquired during the PITAC meetings. Some have criticized 
this institution as adding opacity, rather than transparency, to the whole 
process.157 Finally, a new bill for consideration in the U.S. Congress calls for the 
establishment of a Chief Transparency Officer in USTR who will “consult with 
Congress on transparency policy, coordinate transparency in trade negotiations, 
engage and assist the public,” and advise the USTR.158 
Via the notice-and-comment procedure in secondary regulation, the U.S. 
administration has gained a first-mover advantage position vis-à-vis the EU for 
being more transparent and accessible to individuals interested in participating 
in rulemaking.159 As a consequence, the USTR has questioned its counterpart 
for lacking transparency in its rulemaking procedures that do not offer 
individuals a systematic opportunity to comment on the proposed regulations.160 
Additionally, U.S. businesses have attacked the Commission for several 
reasons, including: opacity in publishing its initial drafts before their 
 
 154.  Cary Coglianese et al., Transparency and Public Participation in the Rulemaking Process, A 
Nonpartisan Presidential Transition Task Force Report, Task Force Report, v, vi–vii (2008), 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/transparencyReport.pdf.  
 155.  See RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRANSPARENCY (Padideh Ala’i & Robert G. Vaughn eds., 
2014).   
 156.  19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(3) (2012).  
 157.  Maira Sutton, U.S. Trade Rep on the Charm Offensive—Slight Tweaks to Secret TPP Process is 
Far from Enough, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Feb. 24, 2014), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/us-trade-rep-charm-offensive-slight-tweaks-secret-tpp-process-
far-enough. 
 158.  Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, H.R. 1890, 114th 
Cong. (2015).  
 159.  See Abraham Newman and Elliot Posner, Putting the EU in Its Place: Policy Strategies and the 
Global Regulatory Context (unpublished comment, on file with the European Union Studies 
Association), https://eustudies.org/conference/papers/download/42. 
 160.  See Shawn Donnan, US Pushes for Greater Transparency in EU Business Regulation, FIN. 
TIMES, (Feb. 23, 2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6e9b7190-9a65-11e3-8e06-00144feab7de.html. 
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introduction to the European Parliament and the Council under the ordinary 
legislative procedure and the failure to provide individual comments for the 
Commission’s delegated legislation. Interestingly, this limitation in access has 
been portrayed by businesses and USTR alike as a lack of transparency rather 
than as an attempt to limit the influence of corporate lobbies in Brussels.161 
The principle of transparency in the EU can be found in Article 15(3) of the 
Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union.162  This provides that any 
citizen or person residing in a member state shall have access to documents of 
its institutions, agencies, and offices, subject to limitations, operationalized 
through a regulation.163 The Commission publishes an electronic questionnaire 
for all stakeholders to send in their views; sets up meetings in Brussels for 
participation from consumer groups, industry associations and NGO’s; conducts 
an independent study to analyze the economic, social, and environmental 
impacts of agreements; and creates a dialogue with Council, European 
Parliament, and the member states.164 
Soon after the transparency critiques of the TTIP negotiation came from 
civil society, the European Parliament, which gained more power in vetoing 
international agreements after the Lisbon Treaty, similarly voiced its 
disagreement with TTIP. Not surprisingly, the European Parliament’s worries 
resonated with the European Ombudsman, who feared that the TTIP 
negotiation was not transparent and disproportionately favored some corporate 
groups at the expense of other civil society groups.165 
The Commission’s reaction to the USTR position did not take long, and in 
2014, with the newly elected Junker Commission, the trajectory of negotiations 
changed.166 The “transparency package” put forward by Trade Commissioner 
Cecilia Malmström has proven, at least at the declaratory level, to be a strong 
response to Froman’s attacks.167 In her proposal Malmström suggested to fully 
inform the European Parliament, rather than just the members of Parliament, 
on the international trade committee about the next steps of the TTIP 
negotiation.168 She then put the Commission back in the front seat of the 
 
 161.  USTR, 2014 Report on Technical Barriers to Trade 46 (2014).   
 162.  TFEU art. 15(3). 
 163.  See Regulation 1049/2001/EC (noting that the regulation only allows access to the documents 
of “institutions” and not “institutions, bodies, offices, and agencies” as in Article 15(3)).  
 164.  European Commission Factsheet, Transparency in EU Trade Negotiations, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/june/tradoc_151381.pdf.  
 165.  EU Ombudsman  Demands More TTIP Transparency, EURACTIV (July 31, 2014), 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/trade-industry/eu-ombudsman-demands-more-ttip-transparency-
303831. 
 166.  European Commission, Communication to the Commission Concerning Transparency in TTIP 
Negotiations (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/news/2014/docs/c_2014_9052_en.pdf. 
 167. Commission Launches Transparency Initiative for TTIP and Lobbying, EURACTIV (Nov. 20, 
2014), http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/commission-launches-transparency-
initiative-ttip-and-lobbying-310183. 
168.diSee generally Communication to the Commission Concerning Transparency in TTIP 
Negotiations (Nov. 25, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/news/2014/docs/c_2014_9052_en.pdf (endorsing 
Commissioner Malmström’s approach). 
NICOLA_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/8/2016  2:40 PM 
No. 4 2015] THE POLITICIZATION OF LEGAL EXPERTISE 201 
transparency game through online publications open to the general public on 
the EU position in each round of the TTIP negotiation.169 Finally, she launched 
an open consultation about the controversial Investor-to-State-Dispute 
Settlement (ISDS) clause in TTIP and provided a report responding to the 
nearly 150,000 replies.170 
Even though the Commission’s approach to the negotiation has been 
innovative and informative, and has received important media attention while 
also regaining a first-mover advantage vis-à-vis the USTR, the trade-offs and 
the political choices made by the trade negotiators remain highly secretive.171 
C. Hermeneutic of Suspicion and Distributive Consequences of Transparency 
With the apparent goal of making the process more legitimate and 
democratic, transparency claims in TTIP end up empowering different interest 
groups. These transparency claims allow public and private interest groups with 
different constituencies across the Atlantic to form transnational alliances, 
catalyze the negotiating process, and create more opacity on the meaning of 
transparency.172 Members from industry to consumer groups, in particular those 
affected by some key sectors in TTIP such as automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and 
medical devices, are very active in stating their position, sponsoring new 
research, and providing money for academic studies to influence the 
negotiators’ views and generate greater knowledge of transparency in TTIP. 
In applying the “hermeneutic of suspicion” to the general principle of 
transparency, legal scholars question whether “outcomes either follow from 
particular ideologies or represent compromises of conflicting ideologies, rather 
than of conflicting universal principles and values.”173 For example, the 
underlying political ideologies in TTIP can taint the choices of the negotiators 
and lawyers drafting the regulatory cooperation provisions. There is an 
ideological spectrum with an ideology that, on the one hand, protects the 
decisions by sovereign states to avoid a race-to-the-bottom scenario and to limit 
free trade regimes. On the other hand, the opposite ideological position stems 
from the fact that trade liberalization offers gains in terms of economic benefits 
ranging from efficiency in regulatory governance to setting transatlantic 
 
 169.  EU Negotiating Texts in TTIP (2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/ 
index.cfm?id=1230. 
 170.  See Commission Report on Online Public Consultation on Investment Protection and Investor-
to-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement 
(TTIP), (Jan. 13, 2015), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf. 
 171.  Christian Oliver, EU Pushes Back Against TTIP Trade Agreement Secrecy, FIN. TIMES, (Jan. 1, 
2014), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fe54facc-968b-11e4-a83c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3QaaVX4Fd. 
 172.  See H. Patrick Glenn, Transparency and Closure, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
TRANSPARENCY (Padideh Ala’i & Robert G. Vaughn eds., 2014) (addressing what Glenn calls the 
paradox of transparency, which create insiders and outsiders. For instance, in the case of TTIP 
transparency is a bargaining tool that paradoxically legitimates a setting, a secret trade negotiation, in 
which the norm remains closure).  
 173.  See Duncan Kennedy, Political Ideology and Comparative Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 35, 36 (Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei eds., 2012). 
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standards for international trade. These two ideological poles are situated on a 
spectrum ranging from a more social to a more neoliberal vision of market 
economies. Along this ideological continuum, trade negotiators make different 
choices about the meaning and the function of transparency as a central 
principle in transatlantic regulatory cooperation. 
A second type of hermeneutic of suspicion goes hand in hand with the 
balancing of conflicting considerations that lawyers will have to promote vis-à-
vis an ex ante or ex post approach to regulation. Proponents of regulatory 
cooperation agree that the EU takes a more “proactive” approach whereas the 
U.S. uses a “reactive” approach to regulate its markets. As a result, EU 
economic regulation invites producers and labor groups to the negotiation table 
early on through institutional channels in a neocorporativist fashion. On the 
other hand, the U.S. regulatory focus is reactive insofar as it invites, ex post, a 
plurality of stakeholders to participate in the regulatory process after the 
proposed rule is released. Not only businesses but also consumers, as members 
of a universal class, are invited to the stakeholder consultation table. As 
Francesca Bignami has indicated, these different regulatory styles are 
characterized either by neocorporatism in the EU or pluralism in the United 
States. 174 
In EU and U.S. decision-making processes, the principle of transparency is 
fundamental in the regulation of market economy. Because of the malleability 
of the transparency concept, this principle does not have objective functions, 
nor does it reflect universal values.175 Transparency is a notion embedded in 
administrative, economic, and social structures through which it acquires 
political value. Rather than in opposition to one another, the function of this 
principle can be explained on a continuum ranging between different 
institutional choices exemplified by green and white papers aimed at particular 
stakeholders, agency-to-agency cooperation, notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
and regulatory impact assessments. 
At one end of the spectrum is a “proactive” or ex ante pole whereby 
agencies use transparency to ensure fair and equal participation for different 
economic actors, such as businesses, unions, consumers, and civil society, in the 
regulatory process. This pole’s focus is on how to structure ex ante access to the 
regulatory process by soliciting participation of more vulnerable economic 
groups while controlling excessive corporate lobbying. At the other end of the 
spectrum is the “reactive,” ex post approach to transparency that includes all 
the interested individuals in secondary regulatory processes. The ex post focus 
is not so much about ensuring that the entire society is on board with the 
regulatory process, but rather, it is about ensuring that all the interested parties 
 
 174.  See Francesca Bignami, Introduction, in FRANCESCA BIGNAMI AND DAVID ZARING, ELGAR 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION (forthcoming 2016) (relying on the diverse 
approach to pluralism in the United States and the neocorporatism in the EU when mapping 
differences and similarities in comparative regulation). 
 175.  See RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 155. 
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in a regulatory process can be heard. 
 
Figure 1 
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 In understanding the different functions of transparency, any proposal on 
IRC becomes a contextual and contingent one—determined by political 
ideologies such as a more welfarist or neoliberal views of market economics, as 
well as considerations over proactive or reactive approaches to regulate 
markets. Each regulatory choice can be positioned on the table above, thus 
creating benefits or costs to particular groups in markets and societies. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Lawyers who have been involved in the TTIP negotiations and made some 
transparency claims have not openly engaged with the hermeneutic of 
suspicions in comparative law. While their work is either sponsored or used 
politically by trade negotiators and lobbyists, the lawyers continue to portray 
regulatory cooperation as a neutral or experimentalist process that remains 
technical rather than political.176 
As a result, transparency claims make the TTIP negotiation seem more 
democratic, when in fact they enable negotiators to leverage their positions vis-
 
 176.  Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 133, at 128; see also Fernanda Nicola, The Paradox of 
Transparency: The Politics of Regulatory Cooperation in the TTIP Negotiation, SIDIBLOG (Feb. 4, 
2015), http://www.sidi-isil.org/sidiblog/?p=1298. 
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à-vis others. Because of this increasing strategic use of transparency claims, the 
role of legal scholarship is crucial to ensure the production of critical knowledge 
about transatlantic regulatory cooperation. Scholars have become the 
manufacturers of legal knowledge that can be effectively used and sponsored by 
trade negotiations irrespective of its normative backdrops. Instead of 
comparing administrative legal regimes to find similarities or differences 
between U.S. and EU regulatory processes, this article suggests foregrounding 
the distributive consequences of transparency claims for different groups 
affected by transatlantic trade. 
 
